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• NASA’s low SWaP HITL2 results indicate a surveillance range of 
2.5 nmi allows pilots to perform well in maintaining DWC
• However, with 2.5 nmi, only the 25% of the encounters 
(specifically, slow crossing) have Corrective alerts > 14 seconds
• Simulation of an encounter set can show the percentage of 







































































Results are derived from AAG’s 2PAIRS. RDR is based on head-on encounters.
The following plots are created from previous simulation results:
1. NASA simulation
– Encounters : NASA UAS trajectories overlay with RADES radar tracks
– Field of Regard: 8 nmi spherical range with full bearing and elevation
– Alerting times: based on times to the buffered non-cooperative DAA 
well clear, (2200 ft HMD*, 0 sec τmod*, 450 ft h*)
2. CAL Analytics simulation
– Encounters: Hybrid
• ownship sampled from NASA UAS trajectories
• intruders created from the Lincoln Lab uncorrelated encounter model
– Field of regard: ±110° bearing, ±15° elevation, and RDR = MIR + 25, 
15, and 10 seconds
– Alerting times: based on times to the non-cooperative DAA well clear
Alerting Timeline Results to be Presented
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• 17,100 hours of projected UAS mission trajectories in one day 
overlaid with each of 21 days’ radar recorded visual flight rules 
(VFR) traffic 




Speed and Altitude of UAS and VFR Traffic
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• Unmitigated
• 8 nmi spherical field of regard (FoR) with full bearing and 
elevation
• About 8,200 encounters result in LoDWC
• Alerts are computed by DAIDALUS based on
– The buffered DWC has HMD* = 3342 ft (1.519 x 2,200 ft)
– 60 and 30 seconds before a predicted loss of buffered DWC for 
corrective and warning alerts, respectively
• Distributions of the horizontal distance of the aircraft (range) 
at the first corrective and warning alerts are computed for
– Large intruders (130 to 170 kts)
– Medium intruders (100 to 130 kts)
– Small intruders (< 100 kts)
• Distribution of a 15-second corrective alert (45 second alert in 
total) estimated by interpolation
Simulation Setup
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First Alert for Large Intruders (Between 130 and 170 KTAS)
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45 sec alert 
(approx.)
MIR + 25 sec
MIR + 15 sec
MIR + 20 sec
First Alert for Medium Intruder (Between 100 and 130 KTAS)
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45 sec alert 
(approx.)
MIR + 25 sec
MIR + 15 sec
MIR + 20 sec
First Alert for Small Intruder (<=100 KTAS)
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MIR + 25 sec
MIR + 15 sec
45 sec alert 
(approx.)
MIR + 20 sec
• The percentage is considered optimistic since the simulated 
FoR covers all bearings and elevations
• When setting RDR to be MIR + 25 seconds (current ATAR MOPS 
adopts this), >= 90% of encounters achieve 45 seconds alerts 
(15 corrective + 30 warning) in all 3 intruder categories
• With RDR set to MIR + 20 seconds, > 74% of encounters 
achieve 45 seconds alerts
• With RDR set to MIR + 15 seconds, the 45 second alert 
percentage varies between 58% and 75% across categories
Discussions
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CAL’s Alerting Time with a Finite FoR
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• CAL Analytics performed alerting time analysis using a hybrid 
encounter set that sampled ownship from NASA UAS 
trajectories and intruder from Lincoln Lab’s uncorrelated 
model
• The following plots show the first alert time distribution for a 




































































     
 
 
Alerting Time with a Finite FoR
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𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 = 𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅 + 25 sec *
45 seconds before LoDWC
Alerting Time with a Finite FoR
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𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 = 𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅 + 15 sec *
10/23/2019 * RDR is based on additional time allotted before MIR for Pilot Response / ATC Coordination.
45 seconds before LoDWC
Alerting Time with a Finite FoR
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𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 = 𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅 + 10 sec *
* RDR is based on additional time allotted before MIR for Pilot Response / ATC Coordination.
10/23/2019
45 seconds before LoDWC
• MIR + 25 seconds allows 45 seconds alert for almost all 
encounters except for those overtaking intruders that come 
from outside the FoR
• MIR + 15 seconds allows 45 seconds alert for only about half of 
the non-overtaking intruders encounters
Discussions
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• Additional data or plots?
– For MIR + 22 seconds
– For high-speed encounters
• Do we want to trade some corrective alert times for reduction 
of the required surveillance range?
– EO/IR’s range and range rate estimation becomes problematic beyond 3 
nmi
• If the EO/IR sensor can cover more than ±110° bearing (Julien 
is looking into it), what would be a good criteria for evaluating 






1. Farjon J., “White paper EO/IR sensor model”, SAFRAN ED, 2019
• Range estimation error1:
– 𝜀𝜀 𝑅𝑅 = 𝜇𝜇 𝑅𝑅 + 𝜎𝜎 𝑅𝑅 ∗ 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 1
• R = range (meters)
• 𝜇𝜇 𝑅𝑅 = 50 − 0.15 ∗ 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 0;𝑅𝑅 − 3000 (error bias at range R)
• 𝜎𝜎 𝑅𝑅 = 0.03 ∗ 𝑅𝑅 (error standard deviation at range R)
• Randn: Matlab Normally distributed random numbers
– Time correlation is 5 s
• Range rate estimation error1:
– σ is 5% of true range rate (e.g., if range rate is 200 kts, std. dev. is 10 kt)
– Delay is 5 s (time needed to provide information from first detection)
– Time correlation is 2 s (TBC)
Alert Times with the Phase 1 FoR
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• Figure D-5 in DO-366 shows the 
alerting time distribution with the 
Phase 1 radar FoR imposed
o It appears that a considerable 
amount of encounters have less 
than 45 seconds alerts before 
LoDWC
o MITRE’s Study 5 shows that 45% 
of encounters do not have 
sufficient corrective alert times 
(14 seconds)
o HALE, MALE, and LEPR combined
CDF of Range at First DAA Alerts for All Intruder
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45 sec alert 
(approx.)
Probability of Short Corrective Alerts
(Time between CA and WA <= 14 seconds)
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CDF of Time between CA and WA for Low Speed UAS
(When sensor range is 4nmi with Full FoR)
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CDF of Time between CA and WA for Phase 1 UAS (to 200 KTAS)
(When sensor range is 4nmi with Full FoR)
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